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Abstract
This paper presents an identiﬁcation strategy that allows us to study both
the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy and the role that monetary policy plays
in the transmission of sectoral shocks. We apply our methodology to the case
of the U.S. and ﬁnd some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the sectoral responses to
monetary policy. We also ﬁnd that monetary policy is a signiﬁcant source of
sectoral transfers. In particular, a shock to equipment and software investment,
which we naturally identify with the high-tech crisis, induces a response by the
monetary authority that generates a temporary boom in residential investment
and durables consumption but has almost no eﬀect on the high-tech sector.
Finally, we perform an exercise evaluating the model’s predictions about the
automatic and more aggressive monetary policy response to a shock similar to
the one that hit the U.S. in early 2001. We ﬁnd that the actual drop in interest
rates we have observed is in line with the predictions of the model.
We thank Ricardo Caballero for helpful comments on a preliminary version of the paper. All
remaining errors are ours.
ycraddatz@worldbank.org.
zThe views expressed in this paper are the author’s only and do not necessarily represent those


















































































































The long boom in the U.S. during the 1990s came to an end in 2001 with a large
decline in information technology (IT) investment. After growing at an annual rate
of 16% during 2000, IT spending fell by 6% in 2001, while the NASDAQ lost half its
value between September 2000 and March 2001.
In 2001, the The Federal Reserve responded to the end of the IT bubble and
the general collapse of the stock markets by sharply reducing the federal funds rate
by 3 percentage points between January and August; following the September 11
terrorist attacks, the Fed lowered the funds rate by 1.75 percentage points, for a total
decline of 4.75 percentage points that year. This loosening of monetary policy was
accompanied by markedly diﬀerent performances across sectors. While sectors like
housing and automobiles experienced a signiﬁcant boom, IT spending remained ﬂat
during 2002.1
There are, of course, important reasons to care about the diﬀerences in the sectoral
responses to monetary policy actions. For example, monetary policy will have a strong
redistributive component if diﬀerent sectors of the economy have diﬀerent interest rate
sensitivities. In this case, aggregate output stabilization via monetary policy would
be achieved by inducing larger cyclical ﬂuctuations in sectors that are more interest
rate sensitive. Decoupling these sectors from the rest of the economy may induce some
important redistributive eﬀects when factors of production are sector speciﬁc. For
instance, a monetary policy aimed at stabilizing aggregate output may fail to stabilize
employment in response to a shock in a sector with low interest rate sensitivity when
some aspects of human capital are sector-speciﬁc. A diﬀerent reason to care about
the heterogeneous eﬀect of monetary policy is its implications about the eﬀectiveness
of monetary policy as a policy tool. The ability of an interest rate based monetary
policy to jump-start the economy will depend on fraction of GDP associated with
sectors that are highly sensitive to interest rates. We may expect then to ﬁnd a link
between output composition and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, which may be
especially important for policymakers.
These diﬀerential eﬀects are important also because they raise issues about the
role that monetary policy plays in the transmission of sectoral shocks. By changing
1Business forecasts predict only a small recovery for IT investment in 2003. Construction of new
homes hit a 16-year high in December 2002; the volume of new cars was the largest in history during
2001.
1the level of the funds rate in response to a sectoral shock, monetary policy may either
dampen or amplify the dynamic propagation of shocks across sectors. An appropriate
understanding of the way that monetary policy interacts with sectoral shocks is also
very important for policy design and has been largely unexplored in the literature.
This paper presents an empirical methodology based on the estimation of a struc-
tural vector autoregression (VAR) model to analyze the sectoral eﬀects of mone-
tary policy. This methodology allows us to compare the eﬀects of monetary policy
across sectors in terms of their delay, persistence, and sacriﬁce ratio. In addition,
our methodology also allows us to determine how a sectoral shock is transmitted to
the rest of the economy, both directly (through the interactions among sectors) and
indirectly (through monetary policy).
The methodology we propose is an extension of the standard VAR models of
monetary policy. Our speciﬁcation decomposes aggregate GDP and includes all the
components simultaneously in the VAR. The identiﬁcation of this structural VAR is
largely based on standard assumptions: (i) monetary policy responds contemporane-
ously only to the aggregate price index and GDP; (ii) all the components of GDP
responds to monetary policy only with a lag. The only additional assumption we
make is that the only source of contemporaneous comovement across sectors is the
presence of correlated innovations.2 This assumption allows us to solve the problem
in the degrees of freedom that arises in the unrestricted estimation.
We apply our methodology to U.S. data. We decompose GDP into seven components–
durables consumption, nondurables consumption, services consumption, residential
investment, investment in structures, equipment and software investment, and a
residual–and characterize the response of each component to a monetary policy shock.
Our results show that, even at this level of aggregation, there are considerable diﬀer-
ences across components in response to monetary policy. In particular, we ﬁnd that
durables consumption, nondurables consumption, and residential investment have the
largest response to monetary policy, that equipment and software investment has a
mild response, and that, as in other studies (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)), investment
in structures has no response.
We also ﬁnd that a shock to equipment and software investment generates a
2The assumption that there is no contemporaneous relation across sectors has however been
implicitly present in papers that study the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy by looking at one sector
at a time (Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Barth and Ramey (2001), Rigobon and Sacks (1998)). In
contrast to our approach, these papers do not assume any correlation among sectoral perturbations.
2signiﬁcant eﬀect on aggregate GDP. However, its eﬀect on durables consumption,
nondurables consumption, and residential investment is brief because of the coun-
tervailing eﬀect of the automatic monetary policy response induced by the shock.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that a monetary policy shock aimed at smoothing the shock to
equipment and software investment will generate a signiﬁcant boom in the rest of the
economy, especially in residential investment and durables consumption.
Overall, the simulated pattern of responses is remarkably similar to the evolution
of the U.S. economy after the high-tech crisis, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
which highlights the usefulness of our methodology for analyzing monetary policy.
This paper is part of the vast empirical literature on the eﬀects of monetary
policy. Our methodology builds on the structural VAR approach used in this con-
text by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), and Christiano et al. (1996b,a), among others. We extend this
methodology to explore the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy and to consider the
transmission of sectoral shocks. The sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy have been
previously studied by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Barth and Ramey (2001),
among others. Our paper extends this literature in several dimensions. First, these
papers rely on the standard recursiveness assumption for identiﬁcation and typically
add a subset of sectors to an aggregate VAR to avoid getting into a degrees of freedom
problem.3 The problem with this approach is that the whole VAR is re-estimated
for each subset of sectors added to the speciﬁcation.4 Therefore, the structural pa-
rameters of the monetary policy rule are allowed to change across speciﬁcations.5
Second, by analyzing all sectors simultaneously we can study how shocks to particu-
lar sectors impact other sectors and the rest of the economy. In contrast, most of the
papers in the literature study one sector at a time using the recursiveness assumption.
3Under the recursiveness assumption, the number of structural parameters grows quadratically
with the number of sectors in the VAR. So, adding one sector requires a signiﬁcant increase in the
number of observations.
4In this sense, the approach lacks internal consistency. Some of the papers in this literature
(Barth and Ramey (2001), Dedola and Lippi (2000)) have an additional consistency problem: they
add each sector at the bottom of the aggregate VAR. This boils down to assume that monetary policy
aﬀects aggregate GDP only with a lag, but aﬀects contemporaneously each of its components.
5Rigobon and Sacks (1998) partially addressed the issue of the stability of the parameters by
using a two step procedure that ﬁrst estimates the structural innovations from an aggregate VAR
and then feeds these innovations as exogenous variables in the dynamic speciﬁcation of sectoral
output. Even though this approach maintains the parameters of the monetary policy response
stable across sectors, it is less eﬃcient than our procedure, and it also does not permit to analyze
the transmission of sectoral shocks.
3Therefore, they cannot be used to analyze the transmission of sectoral shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical
methodology and the identiﬁcation assumptions. Section 3 documents the sectoral
eﬀects of monetary policy in the U.S.. In section 4, we use our model to analyze
the eﬀect of a shock to equipment and software investment on the rest of the U.S.
economy and to determine the consequences of a monetary policy aimed at stabilizing
that shock. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical methodology
2.1 Standard VAR Analysis of Monetary Policy
We use a VAR model to estimate the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy. Sims (1980)
pioneered the use of VAR to identify exogenous shocks to monetary policy and their
eﬀect on diﬀerent economic aggregates and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1992), among others developed it further. The standard
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where Xt = (Zt; St)0; St is the instrument of the monetary authority, Zt are the
variables in the monetary authority’s information set, and q is a non-negative integer.
This speciﬁcation assumes that the monetary authority follows a policy rule that
is linear on the variables in Zt and their lags. In addition, it is assumed that the
perturbations "t have the following properties:




D  = t
0 otherwise
:
The estimation of this model is usually performed in two steps. First, the parameters





4and second, the structural parameters (Ai and D) are recovered by making a series
of identiﬁcation assumptions. The most widely used identiﬁcation assumption in the
literature is the “recursiveness assumption.” This approach corresponds to assuming
that the structural errors ("t) are orthogonal (D = I) and the matrix summarizing the
contemporaneous relations between the variables in the VAR (A0) is block diagonal.














where the dimensions of the aij blocks of the matrix A0 are determined by the di-
mensions of Z1; S; and Z2:
Intuitively, the recursiveness assumption corresponds to assuming that, under the
monetary policy rule, the contemporaneous values of the variables in Z1t elicit an
immediate change in the monetary policy instrument, but these variables themselves
respond to the instrument only with a lag. Analogously, the values of the variables
in Z2t elicit a lagged change in the monetary policy instrument, but these variables
themselves respond to the instrument change immediately.
It can be demonstrated that the recursivness assumption is suﬃcient to identify
the column of A0 associated wuth the monetary policy instrument; thus, it is also
suﬃcient to determine the response of all the variabels to a monetary policy shock;
however, it is not suﬃcient to determine the response of all the variables to any other
structural shock, because the block diagonal structure of A0 makes the equations in
the upper and lower blocks of the matrix indistinguishable.
The set of variables included in the monetary policy rule (Zt) varies considerably
in the literature. The simplest model considers a measure of activity (usually GDP)
and a measure of the price level (usually the CPI or the GDP deﬂator).6 There are
also diﬀerences regarding the variable to include as the monetary policy instrument.
While some papers argue in favor of using the federal funds rate (Bernanke and
Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998)), others have argued in favor of using the
level of non-borrowed reserves (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)) or the ratio of
non-borrowed to total reserves (Strongin (1995)). Regardless of the monetary policy
6Most papers also include a measure of commodity prices to account for the “price puzzle”, which
we discuss further below (see Christiano et al. (1999)).
5instrument considered, the literature typically assumes that the monetary rule calls
for a response to contemporaneous values of the measures of activity and prices, but
these respond to the monetary policy instrument only with a lag.7
This methodology has proved to be extremely useful in understanding the dynam-
ics of a monetary economy, but it is not exempt from criticism. In particular, the
zero-restrictions implicit in the block diagonal structure of A0; which are crucial for
identifying the monetary policy innovations, are arbitrary.8 We do not address this
criticism in this paper, as we are mainly concerned with understanding the sectoral
aspects of monetary policy.
In summary, the standard way of determining the eﬀects of monetary policy in
the literature is to estimate a reduced form VAR model including at least a measure
of activity and the price level, and a monetary policy instrument. The recursive-
ness assumption is then used to identify the relevant structural parameters. In the
next section we show how, with minor modiﬁcations, this simple framework can be
extended to analyzing the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy and the interactions
among sectors.
2.2 A sectoral model of monetary policy
Our approach to estimating the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy is a simple exten-
sion of the standard model in the literature. We assume that the monetary policy
instrument (Ft) responds only to activity (Yt) and prices (Pt); and decompose the
measure of activity (Yt) into N diﬀerent components, so Xt = (Y1t;:::;YNt; Pt;Ft).












where the Aij terms are the natural expansions of the aij elements to N variables.9
This identiﬁcation would allow us to recover the structural parameters from the
7Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al. (1996b) consider also the possibility that
the monetary policy instrument responds only with a lag to activity and prices, which respond
contemporaneously to the monetary policy shock.
8See Faust (1998), Faust et al. (2003), Rudebusch (1998), and Uhlig (1999).
9For example, a32 is an scalar that contains the response of the interest rate to changes in the
price level. Simmilarly, A31 is a 1xN vector containing the eﬀect of each sector on the interest rate.
6reduced form parameters. However, disaggregating the measure of activity into its
components would lead us very quickly into a degrees of freedom problem. Indeed, this
model has (N+2)2(q+1)+1 parameters,10 so we would need at least (N+2)(q+1)+1
observations of each variable. Assuming that the frequency of the data is equal to the
number of lags, this implies that we would need at least T = (N+2)+(N+3)=q years
of data in order to estimate the parameters. For example, if we were using 7 sectors
and quarterly data, 12 years of data would leave us with zero degrees of freedom.
As mentioned in the previous section, an additional problem with using the re-
cursiveness assumption to estimate the sectoral model is that it can only identify the
sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy, but it cannot identify the eﬀects of a sectoral shock
on the rest of the economy. Identifying the eﬀect of these shocks requires assumptions
on the coeﬃcients of A0 beyond the block diagonal structure: In particular, it requires
that enough conditions are imposed on the coeﬃcients of A11 so that each equation
can be individually identiﬁed.
For these reasons, we depart from the recursiveness assumption and use an iden-
tiﬁcation scheme that combines some elements of the recursiveness assumption with
additional assumptions from the simultaneous equations view of identiﬁcation. In
particular, we assume that (i) the price level index relevant for monetary policy de-
pends only on aggregate activity, (ii) the monetary policy rule is a function only of
aggregate activity and the price level index, (iii) the structural innovations to diﬀerent
sectors are correlated, and (iv) each sector’s activity aﬀects other sectors only with a























where eN is a row vector of ones of dimension N and Σ is a NxN matrix. Assump-
tions (i) and (ii) are captured by imposing a common coeﬃcient for all sectors in the
10Under the recursiveness assumption, A0 has (N +2)(N +1)+1 parameters, Ai i = 1;:::;q has
(N + 2)2; and D has (N + 2) variances.
7rows of A0 associated with the price index and monetary policy rule ( and ; re-
spectively). These assumptions are implicit in the papers that estimate the eﬀects of
monetary policy using aggregate data (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992)), and they help to reduce the degrees of freedom problem.
They boil down to assuming that the Taylor rule followed by the monetary authority
depends only on aggregate indicators. Assumptions (iii) and (iv) are non-standard
and require further discussion. As previously mentioned, the standard recursiveness
approach would have A11 unrestricted and Σ diagonal, so the sectoral shocks would
be completely idiosyncratic, and any contemporaneous comovement across sectors
would be due to the simultaneous relations captured in A11: Instead, our identiﬁca-
tion scheme assumes that all contemporaneous comovement among sectors is due to
the correlation among their structural innovations.
Before proceeding further, note that assumptions (iii)-(iv) are not necessary to
identify the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy. What we get from assumptions (iii)
and (iv) is a reduction in the number of structural parameters to be estimated and,
most importantly, the possibility of analyzing the eﬀects of a sectoral shock. These
beneﬁts come at the cost of imposing symmetry in the contemporaneous relations
across sectors and having correlated structural sectoral shocks. So, a possible criticism
to our approach is that we make assumptions to identify the eﬀect of sectoral shocks,
but we obtain a model in which these shocks are not truly independent. In order to
address this criticism, we also estimate our model imposing some additional structure
in the covariance matrix that introduces independent sectoral shocks. In particular,
we also consider the case in which sectoral shocks are orthogonal and all the correlation
among sectors is due to an aggregate shock. This corresponds to assuming that:
"t = Γzt + t;





E[t] = 0; E[t
0
t] = Ω diagonal,
where Γ = (1;:::;N;0;0)0:
Of course, this is not the ﬁrst attempt to estimate the sectoral eﬀects of monetary
policy. The main contribution of this paper is our identiﬁcation approach, which
allows us to identify the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy and the transmission of
sectoral shocks simultaneously, making very few additional assumptions beyond the
8standard VAR models in the literature. The approach typically followed in the lit-
erature on the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy (e.g., Barth and Ramey (2001),
Dedola and Lippi (2000)) is to estimate a structural VAR that includes aggregate
variables (GDP, a price index, and a commodity price index), the monetary pol-
icy instrument (usually the federal funds rate), and an index of industrial activity
(typically an industrial production index)–in that order–and that identiﬁes the ef-
fects of monetary policy using the recursiveness assumption. That is, they assume
Xt = (Yt; Pt; CPt; Ft; Yit)0: Under the standard recursiveness assumption, the order-
ing of this VAR assumes that the monetary policy rule reacts contemporaneously
to the values of Yt; Pt;and CPt; but those variables react to the monetary policy
instrument only with a lag. It also assumes that monetary policy responds to the
activity of sector i with a lag, but that sector i is aﬀected contemporaneously by
the monetary policy instrument. It is clear that these two sets of assumptions are
mutually inconsistent: we cannot assume simultaneously that monetary policy does
not aﬀect any component of aggregate activity contemporaneously, but it does aﬀect
contemporaneously the sum of them. More importantly, by estimating a diﬀerent
VAR for each sector, these papers permit variation both on the parameters of the
monetary policy rule and on the information set relevant for the monetary policy
response. This aﬀects the model’s ability to compare the eﬀects of monetary policy
across sectors. In contrast, we provide a methodological framework that estimates a
common monetary policy rule across sectors, which allows us to perform meaningful
comparisons, and it is based on a clear set of identiﬁcation assumptions that can be
subject to debate and robustness checks.
3 Sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy in the U.S.
This section presents the results obtained by applying our methodology to the estima-
tion of the sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy in the U.S.. We decompose U.S. GDP
into seven components: durables consumption (CDUR), nondurables consumption
(CNDUR), services consumption (CSER), residential investment (IRES), equip-
ment and software investment (IEQUIP), structures investment (ISTRUC), and a
residual compressing government expenditure, inventory investment, and net exports
(RESTt). We use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a measure of the price level and
the federal funds rate (FFR) as the monetary policy instrument. So, our vector Xt
9corresponds to (CDURt; CNDURt; CSERt; IRESt; IEQUIPt; ISTRUCt; RESTt;
CPIt; FFRt)0; and we estimate the structural parameters of (3) and (4) by Maximum
Likelihood11 using quarterly data for the period 1955:1-2002:3.12 We ﬁrst present the
results obtained for aggregate activity (the sum of the sectoral eﬀects) and compare
them with previous results in the literature as a benchmark for our methodology.
Then we turn to the sectoral results.
3.1 An aggregate benchmark
In an aggregate model of monetary policy with GDP, prices, and the federal funds
rate (FFR) in the VAR, the matrix A0 has three relevant parameters: (i) the eﬀect
of output on prices, (ii) the automatic response of the FFR to output, and (iii) the
automatic response of the FFR to prices. As our methodology assumes that the
contemporaneous Taylor rule followed by the monetary authority responds only to
aggregate quantities, we directly estimate each parameter (; ; and p in equation
(3) respectively). The coeﬃcients estimated for these parameters are reported in
Table 1. The results are consistent with a policy rule aimed at stabilizing output and
prices. The coeﬃcients of  and p are negative, which implies that the monetary
authority tends to raise the FFR in response to an increase in output or prices. The
three coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
The coeﬃcient obtained for  is somewhat puzzling because it implies that prices
fall contemporaneously in response to an increase in output. There are two possible
explanations for this result. First, it is possible that the output innovations are
positive productivity shocks, which are associated with price reductions. Second, it
is possible that the result reﬂects the well known “price puzzle”–where an increase in
commodity prices, which we do not control for, tends to increase the aggregate price
and to reduce output.13
11The parameters can also be estimated by a two-step procedure (see Raddatz and Rigobon
(2003a)). The ﬁrst step consists of estimating the reduced form parameters, and the second step
recovers the structural parameters using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The results
obtained with both procedures are remarkably similar. The main diﬀerence is that, consistent with
the larger degrees of freedom of the ML estimation, the main structural coeﬃcients (A0 and Σ) are
more precisely estimated.
12The data on the GDP components were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data
on the CPI and the FFR were obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
13See (Sims (1992)) for a discussion of the “price puzzle”. We do not include a commodity price
index in order to focus on the sectoral results.
10Table 1: Coeﬃcients of contemporaneous eﬀects
Parameters
b  b  b p
0.145 -0.238 -0.689
(0.049) (0.140) (0.205)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
Indeed, the impulse response functions reported in Figure 1 clearly show the “price
puzzle.” They measure the eﬀect of a one standard deviation shock to the FFR on
aggregate GDP, which is computed by aggregating the individual sectoral responses
to the monetary policy innovation.
The monetary policy shock–corresponding to an 80 basis points rise in the FFR–
induces an immediate response from aggregate GDP, which contracts for about eight
quarters before starting to return to its baseline level.14 Prices initially increase but
start to fall around the ﬁfth quarter. The main message from this exercise is that
our estimations of the size of the shock and the responses of the aggregate variables
are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with previous estimations from VAR
models that used aggregate GDP (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Christiano et al.
(1999)).
3.2 What do the residuals look like?
In the empirical literature analyzing monetary policy using the structural VAR ap-
proach, the estimated structural residuals of the monetary policy equation are in-
terpreted as monetary policy shocks. Similarly, in our approach the structural in-
novations to a sector’s equation are interpreted as (non-orthogonal) shocks to that
sector. In this section, we describe some characteristics of the structural residuals
and compare them with previous estimations of the innovations to monetary policy
and recent events in the U.S. economy. This comparison allows us to observe whether
our model is capturing some salient features of the data.
14The magnitudes are expressed in percentage points. As the GDP series is normalized by the
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of a shock to FFR on GDP, CPI, and FFR
3.2.1 Comparing the policy shock measure
Figure 2 compares the policy shock measure obtained in our estimations with two
previous measures of monetary policy shocks in the literature: the Romer episodes
(Romer and Romer (1989)) and one of the measures obtained by Christiano et al.
(1996b).15 We ﬁnd a strong correlation between our measure and the Christiano,
et al., measure. This is not really surprising, considering that our identiﬁcation
assumptions regarding the monetary policy rule are very similar to theirs.16 The
main diﬀerence between our speciﬁcation and theirs is that Christiano, et al. assume
that the monetary authority also responds to the level of total and non-borrowed
reserves (though only with a lag). This seems not to be a ﬁrst order issue, given the
high correlation between the two series of structural residuals.
The relation between our policy shock measures and the Romer episodes is also
surprisingly good. With the exception of the third quarter of 1978–a period in which
15For comparability purposes, we use the Christiano, et al. speciﬁcation with the federal funds
rate as the policy instrument, no commodity prices, and benchmark identiﬁcation (see Christiano
et al. (1996b), p. 43). As they emphasize, all their measures are qualitatively similar.
16As noted above, the restrictions imposed on the parameters force the monetary policy rule to
respond only to aggregate GDP and price levels, not to their composition. This is exactly what
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Figure 2: Measures of monetary policy shocks
the Romers report a tightening of monetary policy–the Romer episodes are clearly
associated with the presence of positive monetary policy shocks.
In summary, the monetary policy shocks estimated from the structural residuals
of our model seem to conform well with the results of previous studies.
3.2.2 The High-Tech crisis and the 1990-1991 recession
In the late 1990’s IT related businesses expanded immensely. The NASDAQ com-
posite index, which was closely associated with the “new economy”, reached a peak
in February 2000 at almost 5000 points, more than three times larger than its 1997
level of about 1500. All this hype came to a sudden stop in late 2000 and early
2001. Between August 2000 and August 2001 the NASDAQ fell 60%, from 4200 to
1800 points. At the same time, after growing at 16% during 2000, IT investment
fell by 6% in 2001. The onset of crisis on the high-tech sector marked the end of
the late 1990’s expansion in the U.S. and the beginning of the recent recession. Our
methodology clearly captures this episode. Our estimated structural residuals show
that equipment and software investment experiences two large negative shocks in the
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Figure 3: Shocks to Equipment and Software Investment
tively.17 This situation is depicted in Figure 3, which shows the structural residuals
of the equipment and software investment series.18 Note that these shocks are larger
than any other shocks previously experienced by this sector. Additionally, note that
our residuals also show consecutive positive innovations during the 90’s reﬂecting the
large boom in that sector during that time.
Our structural residuals also seem to capture the events of the 1990-1991 recession.
Between the second quarter of 1990 and the second quarter of 1991 (the oﬃcial
peak and trough dates according to the NBER) we observe large negative shocks
to residential investment (2 std. dev.), services consumption (2.5 std. dev.), and
durables consumption (1.8 std. dev). The situation is summarized in Figure 4, which
shows that this was clearly an episode of constrained aggregate demand. Overall,
these ﬁndings are consistent with the general view that the 1990-1991 recession was
largely associated with a crisis in consumer conﬁdence.
17Shocks of this magnitude are rare, with only four episodes of shocks larger than 2.5 standard
deviations observed within sample (2% of observations). In other words, the distribution of the
structural residuals has no particularly fat tails (though they are fatter than the normal case).
18By construction, the structural residuals are serially uncorrelated, so the series are very noisy.
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Figure 4: Sum of shocks to Durables, Non-durables, Services, and Residential Invest-
ment
3.2.3 September 11 and the Accounting Scandals
The economy was subject to two other important shocks at the end of 2001 and the
beginning of 2002: the September 11 attacks and the accounting scandals after the
collapse of Enron. Because our data are quarterly, it is impossible for us to disentangle
these two shocks, but we can evaluate their overall eﬀect.
As can be seen in Figure 5, most sectors were recovering from the high-tech crisis
when these two shocks struck. Most sectors show positive innovations at the end of
2001 that turn notably negative for the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 and beyond.
3.3 Sectoral sacriﬁce ratios to monetary policy tightening.
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses functions of the diﬀerent GDP components to a
one standard deviation contractionary shock to the federal funds rate. The ﬁgure also
displays the 90% conﬁdence bands associated to the impulse response functions.19
19The conﬁdence bands were estimated by a bootstrap procedure which is more conservative than
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Figure 5: Sectoral Residuals
16The monetary policy shock has a signiﬁcant and lasting eﬀect in four sectors:
durables consumption, nondurables consumption, services consumption, and residen-
tial investment. A minor eﬀect is observed in equipment and software investment. As
previously found in the literature (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)), structures invest-
ment is largely unaﬀected.
The lag in the monetary policy eﬀect is roughly similar across sectors, but some in-
teresting diﬀerences are observed. The trough of the response of GDP to the shock is
achieved in eight quarters. Thus, the maximum eﬀect of monetary policy is achieved
two years after a shock. This magnitude is similar across those sectors in which mon-
etary policy has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect: the maximum eﬀect of the shock
in durables consumption, services consumption, and residential investment is also
experienced at the eighth quarter. The only deviation observed is for nondurables
consumption, with a trough in the twelfth quarter. Some diﬀerences in the lags across
these sectors are also observed when we compare the ﬁrst period in which their re-
sponse to the monetary policy shock is statistically diﬀerent from zero. According
to this measure, the lag of the monetary policy eﬀect is shorter in residential in-
vestment and services consumption than in durables consumption and nondurables
consumption; while residential investment and services consumption respond almost
immediately to the monetary policy shock, the shock has no eﬀect on durables con-
sumption and nondurables consumption until around the second quarter.
One of the sectors with the longest lagged response to monetary policy is equip-
ment and software investment with a trough at the tenth quarter. This ﬁnding pro-
vides some evidence that equipment and software investment has a particularly slow
response to monetary policy. Indeed, it is only around the eighth quarter that the
eﬀect of monetary policy is statistically diﬀerent from zero for reasonable (although
non-standard) conﬁdence levels.
The impulse response functions also show that the monetary policy shock is highly
persistent. According to the point estimators, GDP has still not returned to its
baseline level after twenty quarters. This high persistence is also observed across
sectors, where, with the exception of services consumption, none has returned to
its baseline level after twenty quarters. A conservative measure of the persistence of
monetary policy is given by the number of periods during which the eﬀect of monetary
policy is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. Using this measure
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Figure 7: Sacriﬁce ratios (shock to FFR)
quarters for nondurables consumption, four quarters for services consumption, and
fourteen quarters for residential investment. Under this measure, the persistence in
equipment and software investment would be around two quarters.
A more interesting measure of the eﬀect of monetary policy across diﬀerent sectors
is the sacriﬁce ratio, reported in Table 2. The ratios were computed using the point
estimates and represent a measure of the output loss resulting from the monetary
policy shock for each sector as a fraction of its baseline level. They correspond to
the area between the x axis and the normalized impulse response function during the
period between the monetary policy shock and the minimum of the quarter in which
the series returns to its baseline level and twenty quarters. The normalized impulse
responses for the diﬀerent sectors are reported in Figure 7. We observe in Table 2 that
the two sectors with the largest sacriﬁce ratio are residential investment and durables
consumption. This is not surprising considering that residential investment is only
4.5 percent of the economy but contributes one quarter of the aggregate response.
On the other hand, services consumption has the smallest sacriﬁce ratio among those
sectors with a signiﬁcant response to monetary policy, which is not surprising given
that the services consumption represents one-third of the economy.
19Table 2: Sacriﬁce ratios by sector
Sector Sacriﬁce ratio Sacriﬁce ratio
(point est.) (upper band)
Durables consumption (CDUR) -21.44 -3.83
Nondurables consumption (CNDUR) -8.96 -1.47
Services consumption (CSER) -2.54 -0.07
Residential investment (IRES) -54.41 -15.17
Structures investment (ISTRUC) 1.89 -
Equipment and software investment (IEQUIP) -16.29 -
Note: The sacriﬁce ratio using the point estimates corresponds to the area between the x axis and
the normalized impulse response function during the period between the monetary policy shock
and the minimum of the quarter in which the series returns to its baseline level or 20 quarters. The
normalized impulse response corresponds to the standard impulse responses divided by the average
share of each sector in real GDP during the last six quarters of the data. The sacriﬁce ratio using
the upper band is the area between the x axis and the upper conﬁdence band of the normalized
impulse response function computed during the quarters for which the impulse response function
is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Overall, despite the usual amount of noise present in the estimation of impulse
response functions, we observe some interesting diﬀerences in the eﬀect of monetary
policy across sectors. The evidence reported above suggests that monetary policy
has its largest eﬀect on durables consumption and residential investment; structures
investment and equipment and software investment are much less sensitive. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the observed behavior of the U.S. economy after the high-
tech crisis. The low sensitivity of equipment and software investment to monetary
policy can explain why the IT sector has remained depressed despite the sharp in-
terest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve, while the high sensitivity of the durables
consumption and residential investment is also consistent with the temporary booms
experienced by the housing and automobile sectors. Thee results are not signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by excluding the last two years from the sample. The only eﬀect of this
modiﬁcation is that equipment and software investment becomes slightly more sensi-
tive to monetary policy, which has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect between the sixth
and ninth quarters. The relative sensitivity of equipment and software is, however,
unaﬀected. This evidence suggests that the latest episode is not particularly material
in driving the results.
More generally, these diﬀerences across sectors imply that monetary policy has
20the potential to generate inter-sectoral transfers. These transfers can be particularly
important if the monetary policy response is triggered by a sectoral shock because the
change in interest rate can induce negative comovement between the sector aﬀected by
the shock and the interest rate-sensitive sectors. The transmission of a sectoral shock,
the role played by monetary policy in its transmission, and the pattern of sectoral
decoupling will be analyzed in the next section, which applies our methodology to
the high-tech crisis.
4 The transmission of a sectoral shock: the high-
tech crisis.
One of the main advantages of our methodology is that it allows us to identify the
eﬀect of sectoral shocks and the role that the monetary policy rule plays in their
transmission. As previously explained, the crucial identiﬁcation assumption is that
all contemporaneous comovement across sectors is the result of the correlation of their
structural innovations. This assumption, however, complicates the interpretation
of the sectoral shocks and the impulse response functions. Typically, the impulse
response functions plot the response of the VAR to a structural shock to one of
the variables. Under the standard recursiveness approach, the structural shocks are
orthogonal by assumption, so the source of the innovation is clearly determined. In
our case, the structural innovations to diﬀerent sectors are correlated,20 so a sectoral
shock will typically coincide with simultaneous shocks to the rest of the sectors. It
is this correlation which generates the contemporaneous comovement observed in the
impulse responses.
As described in section 2.2, there are basically two ways of understanding the
correlation of the structural innovations. The ﬁrst is to assume that it corresponds to
the correlation among the sectoral shocks; under this view, there are no idiosyncratic
shocks. The second is to assume that the correlation is due to the presence of an
aggregate shock; under this view, the structural innovations correspond to the combi-
nation of an aggregate shock and an idiosyncratic sectoral shock. Certainly, there is
no empirical way of distinguishing between these two worlds. The true nature of the
20We still maintain the assumption that the structural shocks to monetary policy and prices are
orthogonal to the rest of the shocks and among themselves.
21sectoral shocks, however, must lie somewhere in the middle. Looking at the eﬀect of
a sectoral shock under both extreme identiﬁcation assumptions gives us some bounds
within which the true impulse response function must lie. We believe that this is
an important step forward with respect to the current state of the literature, which
makes no attempt to identify the eﬀect of these kinds of perturbations.
We applied our methodology to explore the eﬀect of a shock to equipment and
software investment which we associate with the kind of shock that triggered the
recent U.S. high-tech crisis. In order to understand the role of monetary policy in
the transmission of the shock, we document both the impulse response functions
of the economy predicted by the full VAR and the counterfactual impulse response
functions obtained when the monetary policy channel of the VAR is suppressed. We
also analyze the dynamic response of the economy if, in response to the shock to
equipment and software investment, the monetary authority reacted with a monetary
policy shock targeted at stabilizing output within a speciﬁc time horizon (considering
the dynamics as given): we simulate the results for horizons of 4, 8, and 12 quarters.
Overall, the results obtained under the two alternative identiﬁcation assumptions
show that the automatic reaction of the monetary authority has a signiﬁcant role
in the propagation of sectoral shocks. We also ﬁnd that the predicted response of
our VAR shows some remarkable similarities to the events observed in the U.S. in
recent years. These similarities are more profound when we assume that, in addition
to its automatic response, the monetary authority reacts to the fall in GDP with a
monetary policy shock.
4.1 Correlated sectoral shocks
The impulse response functions of the economy and its diﬀerent sectors to a one
standard deviation correlated innovation to equipment and software investment are
reported in Figures 8 and 9.21 Figure 8 shows that the shock has a signiﬁcant impact
on GDP, which falls by 54 basis points from its baseline level after two quarters.
According to the Taylor rule, the contemporaneous response of the monetary author-
ity is a reduction of the funds rate of 5 basis points. As activity keeps contracting
21The eﬀect of the correlated sectoral shock is determined as follows. Let R represent the corre-
lation matrix of the structural innovations. That is:
R = diag(Σ)1=2 Σ diag(Σ)1=2:
22after the initial shock, the monetary authority keeps reducing the interest rate until
achieving a fall of 40 basis points two quarters after the shock. There is a signiﬁcant
fall in prices which still persists after 20 quarters. Notice that the shock by itself is
highly persistent and that output remains below its natural level for several years.
As the correlations across sectors are typically positive, almost every sector expe-
riences a contraction as a result of the shock to equipment and software investment.
However, the speed of recovery is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across sectors: services con-
sumption, durables consumption, and residential investment return to their baseline
level much faster than nondurables consumption, equipment and software invest-
ment, and structures investment. As discussed above, the former are precisely those
sectors with the highest sensitivity to monetary policy. So their fast recovery can
be attributed to the eﬀect of the fall in interest rates resulting from the automatic
response of the monetary authority. Likewise, as discussed above, equipment and
software investment had a small response to monetary policy, so it is not surprising
that that sector seems to be unaﬀected by the reaction of the monetary authority and
that it remains in recession for a signiﬁcant length of time. This evidence suggest
that monetary policy stabilizes output in response to a shock to a sector with low
interest rate sensitivity by inducing signiﬁcant transfers towards sectors with high
interest rate sensitivity.
Figures 10 and 11 show the counterfactual impulse response functions obtained
when the monetary policy part of the VAR is suppressed. Figure 10 shows the im-
pulse response functions only of equipment and software investment and aggregate
GDP, and Figure 11 shows the impulse response functions of all the sectors. These
ﬁgures show that, as expected, output recovery is considerably slower without the











Let j be the standard deviation of the structural innovation to sector j: The impulse response
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Figure 10: Aggregate eﬀect of a correlated sectoral shock, no monetary policy case
stimulus of the reduction in interest rates. More interestingly, the sectoral impulse
response functions in Figure 11 provide an interesting benchmark: comparing them
with those in Figure 9 allows us to determine the part of the sectoral dynamics that
are aﬀected by monetary policy. The comparison shows that the quick recoveries of
durables consumption, services consumption, and residential investment observed in
Figure 9 are exclusively due to the eﬀect of monetary policy: without an active mon-
etary policy, the eﬀect of the shock to equipment and software investment on these
sectors is large and long-lasting. In addition, an active monetary policy makes these
sectors signiﬁcantly less correlated with less interest-sensitive sectors like structures
investment.
Figures 12 and 13 show the impulse response functions of the economy and the
sectors to a diﬀerent counterfactual policy exercise: we analyze what happens to the
economy if the monetary authority’s response to the sectoral shock goes beyond the
automatic reaction dictated by its Taylor rule.22 In particular, we ask what happens
if the monetary authority responds with a monetary policy shock aimed at stabilizing
aggregate output in less than two years (eight quarters). Figure 12 shows that the
22This exercise would be aﬀected by the Lucas critique if the shock revealed any new information
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Figure 11: Sectoral eﬀects of a correlated sectoral shock, no monetary policy case
necessary monetary policy shock is 47 basis points, which, added to the automatic
response dictated by the policy rule (5 basis points), induces a contemporaneous
decline in interest rates of 52 basis points. As this swift contemporaneous response
induces a fast recovery in aggregate activity, the interest rate does not fall much
further in future periods; it declines only by an additional 34 basis points the next
quarter before starting to return to its baseline level. However, Figure 13 shows that
this swift policy reaction is unable to stabilize the equipment and software investment
sector: the recession in this sector still continues after two years. On the other hand,
there is a boom in residential investment and durables consumption, which recover
after three quarters and enter into an expansion thereafter. The eﬀect on inﬂation is
small.
4.2 Idiosyncratic sectoral shocks
As previously mentioned, our methodology also allows us to determine the response
of the economy and its diﬀerent sectors to an orthogonal innovation to equipment
and software investment. Because in this case the innovation has no contemporaneous
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Figure 13: Sectoral eﬀect of output stabilization policy (correlated sectoral shock)
27case. In this sense, this exercise gives us a lower bound on the true eﬀect of a sectoral
shock.23 Next, we discuss some general aspects of the results obtained in this case.
For a more comprehensive discussion see Raddatz and Rigobon (2003b).
The sectoral shock induces a signiﬁcant decline in both aggregate GDP and in-
terest rates. But, as expected, the response is quantitatively smaller than in the
correlated case: GDP falls by about 28 basis points after three quarters, the interest
rate responds contemporaneously with a decline of only 2 basis points, after which it
keeps falling and reaches a maximum decline of 21 basis points. This small decline
in interest rates is enough to stabilize the output of sectors with high interest rate
sensitivity, but it is not enough to stop the recession in the rest of the economy:
the eﬀect of the shock on durables consumption, services consumption, and residen-
tial investment, is considerably smaller than its eﬀect on nondurables consumption,
structures investment, and equipment and software investment.
Table 3 provides an overall comparison of the contemporaneous response of inter-
est rates for the cases of a correlated and an independent sectoral shocks. The table
presents the contemporaneous decline in interest rates under four diﬀerent stances
of monetary policy: automatic response implied by the Taylor rule, and aggregate
output stabilization within four, eight, and twelve quarters. The results previously
discussed correspond to the automatic response and to the eight-quarter stabilization.
As expected, the shorter the targeted stabilization period, the larger the required
contemporaneous drop in interest rates. As also expected, the required declines in
interest rate are systematically smaller in the independent sectoral shock case. More
interestingly, the decline required to stabilize output within eight quarters has a sim-
ilar magnitude than the actual decline in the interest rates induced by the Fed during
2001. As documented in section 3.2.2, the structural residuals obtained with our
methodology indicate two consecutive shocks to equipment and software investment
during the ﬁrst two quarters of 2001: a 2.6 standard deviation shock and a 3.9 stan-
dard deviation shock. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the size of the
monetary policy shock required to stabilize aggregate output within two years should
23The structural VAR under the assumption that all sectoral correlations are generated by an
aggregate shock is diﬀerent from the structural VAR with unrestricted correlation of sectoral shocks.
Therefore, the parameters of this VAR were estimated anew. The results obtained for the structural
parameters, presented in the appendix, are remarkably similar to those obtained in the unrestricted
VAR. This similarity implies that the covariance matrix of sectoral shocks is amenable to this kind
of structure. In addition, it makes us very conﬁdent in our estimation procedure.
28Table 3: Decline in the federal funds rate in response to a shock to equipment and
software investment (E & S Inv) (in basis points)
Mon. Policy Correlated shock Independent shock
Stance to E &S Inv to E &S Inv
Automatic Response 5 2
Stabilization in a year 164 93
Stabilization in two years 52 38
Stabilization in three years 47
be around 1.7 percentage points, with a total decline in interest rates of about 2.5
percentage points after two quarters. This amount roughly corresponds to half of the
4.75 percentage point decline in interest rates during 2001.
Overall, both assumptions about the correlations among sectoral shocks produce
similar results. They show that a shock to equipment and software investment gen-
erates a signiﬁcant decline in aggregate output and interest rates. The decline in
interest rates resulting from the automatic response of the monetary authority–given
by its Taylor rule–is enough to stabilize the output of sectors with high interest rate
sensitivity, such as durables consumption and residential investment. If the monetary
authority also reacted with a shock to the interest rate designed to stabilize output
within a year, these sectors would experience a temporary boom. In none of these
case, however, is monetary policy able to stabilize quickly the output of sectors that
are less sensitive to monetary policy, such as equipment and software investment or
structures investment.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present a new methodology that allows us to investigate both the
sectoral eﬀects of monetary policy and its role in the transmission of sectoral shocks.
We apply our methodology to the U.S. and demonstrate that there are interesting
diﬀerences in the response to monetary policy among U.S. sectors. Moreover, we show
that, due to these diﬀerences, a monetary policy rule aimed at stabilizing aggregate
output and prices will have an asymmetric eﬀect across sectors: sectors with high
interest rate sensitivity will experience larger cyclical ﬂuctuations than sectors with
29low sensitivity. Our results also suggest that the sectoral “transfers” involved are
potentially signiﬁcant. In other words, monetary policy will achieve stabilization
only by inducing relatively large expansions and contractions in sectors with high
interest rate sensitivity.
Our estimates indicate that the high-tech crisis in 2001 represented a shock of
roughly 6.5 (2.6 + 3.9) standard deviations. According to our estimates, the simulta-
neous automatic response of monetary policy would be between 6 and 17 basis points
with a trough four quarters into the recession where the funds rate has been reduced
between 70 and 117 basis points. On the other hand, if the monetary authority’s
objective were to recover aggregate output within eight quarters, the reaction to the
shock would have been much larger. Our estimates suggest that the Fed should have
dropped interest rates immediately by between 117 and 152 basis points. The path of
interest rates would have implied that the interest rate should have been reduced by
something between 177 and 259 basis points. These estimates indicate that after the
high-tech crisis we should have expected that a relatively concerned Fed should have
reduced the interest rate by a maximum of 2.5 percentage points. This is remark-
ably close to what the Fed’s actual funds rate reduction. Furthermore, this estimate
includes only the shocks associated with the high-tech crisis; clearly if we were able
to disentangle the aggregate component implied by September 11 and the corporate
governance issues ocassioned by Enron and others, the predicted interest rate reduc-
tion would have been much closer to the 4.5 percent funds rate reduction the Fed
actually made.
From the policy point of view, our results indicate that monetary policy, unfor-
tunately, is not well equipped to deal with sectoral shocks. Indeed, it produces large
reallocations. Therefore, it cannot deal with a sectoral recession, especially if that
sector is not interest-sensitive and if the recession is due to overcapacity. Monetary
policy is, therefore, better equipped to deal with aggregate shocks while ﬁscal policy
is more appropiate for dealing with sectoral shocks. Similar points were discussed in
Europe before the reuniﬁcation (Dornbusch et al. (1998)). Further research should
apply the methodology developed here to evaluate the recent experiences in the Euro
zone.
In this paper we have used demand components to make claims about sectors.
This is, indeed, a short cut, but one that we feel provides very interesting insights
into the dynamic responses of the various components to monetary policy. However,
30future research should replicate these results using sectoral output or employment.
Several other questions are left unanswered in this paper. Probably the most im-
portant is why diﬀerent sectors have diﬀerent sensitivities to monetary policy. We can
speculate that diﬀerences in the importance of ﬁnancial constraints, price stickiness,
or durability are potential causes to be explored, and they also should form part of
future research.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, we see our methodology as a useful
tool to explore some unanswered questions about the eﬀects of monetary policy and
to test diﬀerent hypotheses about the behavior of the monetary authority. For exam-
ple, within academic and policy circles it is frequently speculated that the monetary
authority pays more attention to certain sectors (for example, residential investment)
to decide the stance of monetary policy. This hypothesis can be easily tested in our
framework by relaxing the assumption that the Taylor rule followed by the mone-
tary authority depends only on aggregate output and prices. We plan to tackle the
question of distributional aspects in the Taylor rule in future research.
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Data for the estimation were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The GDP data are quarterly. Quarterly values for
the federal funds rate and the CPI correspond to the quarterly averages of monthly
data. The GDP data are expressed in levels, deﬂated by the CPI,24 and expressed as a
fraction of the last six quarters of real GDP averaged, which is therefore deﬁned as the
baseline level. Therefore, the impulse responses correspond to percentage deviations
from this baseline.25 The CPI and the FFR are expressed in percentage points. The
data were de-trended and de-meaned previous to estimation (using a linear trend).
The results are similar if the trend and constants are estimated in the VAR.
B Estimation of bands
The conﬁdence bands for the impulse response functions reported in the paper were
built by bootstrapping. The detailed procedure is as follows. Let  be the vector
of parameters of the structural model. The estimators of these parameters (ˆ ) were
obtained by maximum likelihood; therefore:
ˆ  = argmax

L(y j)
These estimators are asymptotically normally distributed. Their asymptotic covari-
ance matrix corresponds to the information matrix:
AsyVar(ˆ ) = 
(




24The results are similar if the GDP deﬂator is used instead.
25The results are qualitatively similar if the VAR is estimated in logs. We checked these results
only using the two-step procedure, as the estimation is computationally burdensome. It requires
using the share data at each point in time to recover the aggregate log GDP from the sectoral
log outputs. This aggregation is necessary because both prices and the monetary policy rule are
assumed to depend only on aggregates. In the estimation, shares were considered as given.
34therefore:
ˆ 
dist   N(;AsyVar(ˆ )):
For the bootstrap, we took 500 independent draws of the parameters according to
the normal distribution above. For each set of parameters, we estimated the implied
impulse response function. To construct the bootstrap bands, we ﬁlter 90% of the im-
pulse responses with the smallest overall distance from the impulse response obtained
with the point estimators: let Ψ represent the impulse response function associated
with the point estimators; Ψ is a (N + 2)xL matrix containing the impulse response
function of each VAR series to a speciﬁc shock–where L is the number of periods con-
sidered for the impulse response functions. Analogously, let Ψk represent the impulse
response matrix associated with the kth draw from the normal distribution. Deﬁne














Next, rank the bootstrap impulse responses according to this distance. The upper
band reported in the paper corresponds to the impulse response at the 95th percentile
level of this ranking, and the lower band corresponds to the impulse response at the
5th percentile level of this ranking. Therefore the bands represent a 90% conﬁdence
interval around the point estimates.26
26We select the bands in this manner because the impulse response functions of the diﬀerent series
in the VAR are not independent.
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